I Introduction
The creation of novel forms and the effects of their subsequent selection or elimination is a central theme in complexity studies. Complex processes are at work whenever their outcomes impact on further activity in iterations that generate recurrent feedback processes. In Darwinian theory, sources of variation are independent of the selection which occurs through the elimination of non-adaptive variants. But in the evolution of technologies there are close linkages between the selection and generation of variants and their propagation, instead of each mechanism operating independently as in natural selection. While in natural systems the generation of variety is random and blind, in social systems, variety is often guided by desired outcomes since the experience of selection can contribute to learning. Uncertainty as to actual outcomes encourages a variety of responses, which together generate diversity of economic activity and outcome.
Evolutionary processes are not simply a biological metaphor when applied outside the natural world, but a distinctive mode of transformation in areas that include the evolution of languages, the development scientific knowledge and the advance of technologies. Evolution operate in a distinctive way in different arenas but there are common processes at work. Natural variety is generated through random genetic mutation and combination, blind to selection forces. But in the economy, intelligent agents can anticipate the rewards and sanctions exerted by selection forces, and so experience incentives to respond to them. It is increasingly recognized that co-evolution operates as a meta-evolutionary process in which the interaction of participants contributes to the collective creation of a habitat that shapes their prospects (Goodwin, 1994) . Co-evolution is the collective outcome of responses (whether or not intentional) and feedback effects that accommodate other participants in the system. Selected forms of mutual accommodation or symbiosis, can occur without intentionality when blind accommodating responses are rewarded by survival, or can be pursued purposively by human agents. In other words new variants may be engendered in anticipation of selection conditions, or without prior regard to their likely reception which occurs post hoc through natural selection, 1 " … while no treatment of innovation can ignore a stochastic element, it is also true that innovation represents guided and intentional variation purposely undertaken in the pursuit of competitive advantage. Economic agents learn from experience and anticipate future states of the selective environment in a way quite unknown in biological or ecological selection." (Metcalfe, 1998) though in a setting where fitness is related to capacity to fit into a co-evolving eco-system. When new variants are crafted in anticipation of the selective response, this accelerates the evolution of human artifacts if the selection regime favours innovation but may not do so when selection conditions are less conducive to change.
The focus of this chapter is on the linkages between evolutionary mechanisms in the emergence of new technologies. They are explored through examples in semiconductors, personal computers and electronic messaging. In these sectors, new ventures have been the agents of major innovations, raising questions about the way variety is engendered. Among other radical innovations produced by entrepreneurial entrants are the telephone, electric light, radio broadcasting, photocopying and bio-synthesised insulin (see e.g. Nairn, 2000 , McKelvey, 1996 , suggesting that this is a feature of the way technology advances. We pursue three further questions about evolutionary mechanisms in connection with ICT innovations.
What were the origins of the knowledge exploited by entrepreneurial ventures to produce innovations?
2. What were the mechanisms connecting variety generation and selection processes in the evolution of these technologies? 3. What were the mechanisms connecting selection processes and the propagation of these technologies? Did this involve further variety creation?
A complexity approach is used here to explore how small beginnings led to world-changing developments. The outcomes of evolutionary feedback processes cannot be forecast in any detail in natural or social systems subject to interactive feedback effects. But a complexity perspective can identify common dynamic processes that are not evident from the historical record alone, nor from cross sectional analysis. This study reveals a persistent dynamic operating between the diversity of user needs -met by multiple technical solutions -and the uniformities that make interchange possible. This emerges as a central feature of co-evolution. The study finds that this dynamic has until now accelerated technological evolution in ICT and identifies reasons why rapid innovation may not continue indefinitely without countervailing policies.
II Industries and Innovations
Co-evolution occurs within an environment made up of producers and users. The conventional definition of industries is in terms of competing producers of classes of products (Barney, 1997) .
When the focus is the characteristic structure of an industry, the unaddressed issues are how industries emerge and are transformed over time. It has been proposed that a new industry consists of competing producer webs or networks: "a broad group of firms struggling to shape or influence the perceived value, nature, and technique for carrying out a particular activity" (Munir and Phillips, 2002 p.294) . According to this perspective, it is not until an emerging technology matures that industries take on their characteristic structure after an early period of producer network activity. But from a complexity perspective, network activity is not confined to producers but extends to user or consumer groups and related organizations including professional organisations and standards bodies. These networks make up ecosystems of related production and consumption (Moore, 1996) . Nor are production webs just a transitional feature of emerging industries; production networks persist and evolve in interaction with user groups and other participants in a business ecosystem.
In the next section we review the early emergence of the information technology and communications sector. We attempt to trace feedback connections between variety generation, selection and propagation. We go on to examine the swarming of innovations that occurred as the density of complementary technologies increased, and view the boom and slump as a further manifestation of complexity.
Semiconductors: the Integrated Circuit and Central Processing Unit
It was in the R&D laboratory of a successful early entrant to the electricity industry, Bell Laboratories, that the transistor was created in 1947. Constructed from semiconductor materials such as germanium and silicon, the transistor allowed the magnification of electronic impulses. It required less current, generated less heat, and was over fifty times smaller than the vacuum tubes earlier used for this purpose (Wolfe, 1983) . With US government grants that continued into the Cold War, Bell Labs was funded in some respects like a public sector research institute. Within about five years, transistors were reliable enough for commercial use. They were exploited not by This was the origin of a swarm of entrepreneurial endeavours that created the semiconductor sector in Silicon Valley, largely through multi-generational spin-outs. Shockley fell out with his employees, who left and started up their own firms. The first spin-out was Fairchild Semiconductors, originally a joint venture, and the first company to work exclusively in silicon.
It was at Fairchild Semiconductors that, in 1959, Robert Noyce invented the integrated circuit, which combined a number of transistors, diodes, resistors and capacitors onto a single piece of semiconductor. Ten years later, Noyce had spun out his own company, Intel, with Gordon Moore. Within two years Noyce and Moore had developed the 1103 memory chip, the size of two letters in a line of type, each chip containing four thousand transistors. "At the end of Intel's first year in business, which had been devoted almost exclusively to research, sales totalled less than three thousand dollars and the work force numbered forty-two. In 1972, thanks largely to the 1103 chip, sales were $23.4 million and the work force numbered 1,002. In the next year sales almost tripled, to $66 million, and the work force increased two and a half times, to 2,528" (Wolfe, 1983) . Other semiconductor ventures were drawn by these high returns, the numbers fuelled by large numbers of engineers produced by universities in the US and by employee departures to found new spin outs. By 1972 there were 330 semiconductor manufacturing firms in the United States (Freeman, 1995 p.234 pioneer from gaining licensing revenues and creating an alliance of companies using its operating system. In the UK, another pioneer, Acorn Computers, also followed a proprietary strategy, not anticipating that in an industry reliant on complementary products, customers would soon shun a minority system incompatible with the industry standard. After the emergence of a dominant design in the form of the IBM PC, the numbers of exits from the industry exceeded the number of entries, resulting in a fall in producer numbers reminiscent of other complex assembled product industries examined by Utterback (1995) . enshrined in what has come to be known as "Moore's Law" which has been used since the late 1980s to refer to exponential increases in computing performance. 6 The factors supporting this empirical generalisation were complex. Market forces were operative, but US government funding of information technologies and South East Asian government support for their emerging semiconductor industries, were enabling factors making possible the massive improvement in the performance and yield of computer chips and increasing miniaturization.
6 In 1965, Gordon Moore, then a Director of Fairchild Semiconductor, observed that the number of components on a costeffective silicon wafer had doubled each year since 1959. He predicted that this rate of increase would continue for a further 10 years. In 1975, Moore extended his prediction, but this time referred to the maximum complexity over 2 year periods. The period of the effect is frequently quoted as 18 months (e.g. EC, 2000; Cringely, 1996) .
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$16,000 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 $m as enablers for a wide range of applications, from e-commerce to online gaming. Connectivity extended the use of the PC beyond word and data processing to the provision of a data and communications portal. In the office, more people were using a computer for internet-based tasks 
III Discussion: Unique Developments and Common Processes
We return to the questions raised in the introduction concerning linkages between variety creation, selection and propagation processes and ask them of the ICT sector. A complexity approach reveals a persistent dynamic operating between the diversity of user needs -met by multiple technical solutions -and the uniformities that make interchange possible. This dynamic interplay between variety and uniformity has provided the impetus for complementary and compatible innovations. As complementary technologies matured, increasing returns promoted an economic boom, but as asynchronies built up they precipitated the ensuing slump, a recurrent feature of rapid technological advance.
The agents of variety generation and the origins of their knowledge
Co-evolution did not occur immediately. Unrelated experiments took place around an enabling technology before producers came up with products at a price and with specifications attractive to consumers. Entrepreneurial firms hit upon innovative solutions as they sought to exploit business opportunities in the face of stringent resource constraints. Early periods of ferment of this kind have been identified in many other industries (Utterback, 1994; Nairn, 2000) . Variety generation was in each of these examples made possible by new knowledge developed with the support of public funding and made available in the public domain. Entrepreneurs with relevant experience and expertise were able to perceive and pursue the opportunities offered by knowledge newly entering the public domain.
A pool of knowledge representing an investment of time and effort forms outside the market arena for two main reasons. Firstly, scientific knowledge undergoes its own evolutionary processes and advances create an independent problem-solving potential that may have unexpected market applications. Secondly, the payback anticipated from funding the commercialisation of research seldom attracts market investors, who look for earlier and more certain returns on capital.
9 In the case of transistors, microcomputers and electronic messaging, established companies had access to scientific and technological knowledge, and in some cases involvement in their development, with support from public funds. However, entrepreneurial ventures had no vested interests in prior technologies and ways of organizing business, and had no existing customers to alienate or reputation to sully by offering a product based on immature technology.
In semiconductors, technological performance depended on a pool of resource provided by the public sector, no less than on market forces. Although the transistor, integrated circuit and microprocessor were invented in private companies, Bell Labs, Fairchild and Intel, there were years of technical expertise funded by government behind their inventions. Major federal contracts supported development work and the Small Business Innovation Research programme (SBIR) made it possible for new entrepreneurial firms to access this funding (Wessner, 2003) .
Shockley, Fairchild and others employed large numbers of PhDs trained in universities supported
by government funding. At Intel, the creator of the microprocessor, Ted Hoff, came straight from research at Stanford. The US defense department supported scientific and technical education in universities on an unprecedented scale (Lowen, 1997 ).
The microcomputer is often cited as an industry that was the product of pure enterprise without government subsidy (Fong, 2001) . But here too the costs of developing the technologies that went into such features as the graphical user interface (GUI), the mouse and the local area network (LAN), were not borne wholly by the market. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was heavily involved. DARPA provided extensive support for selected computer science departments throughout the US, including UC Berkeley and Stanford. DARPA funds made possible the accelerated development of graphics through the sponsorship of the CAD industry and through support for the computer scientists who developed GUI advances and LANs (Hafner and Lyon, 1996) . DARPA employed and supported the knowledge generation of many of those who were later active in Xerox PARC in Palo Alto, the home of developments that inspired Apple's Macintosh computer and ultimately Microsoft Windows (Fong, 2001 ). Much DARPA related business was carried out at Xerox PARC itself (Hafner and Lyon, 1996 p.238 ).
Without Cold War defense funding, the microcomputer industry could not have grown so quickly. A pool of knowledge funded outside the market and accessible to new ventures compensated for the short-term focus of capital markets. The success of these sectors made possible the expansion of commercial venture capital.
Both the Internet and the World Wide Web, which were necessary underpinnings for online electronic messaging, emerged from government-funded activities, the former from the US ARPANET, and the latter from the work of Tim Berners-Lee at CERN. Again, it was entrepreneurs who identified and acted to exploit the opportunities in a variety of ways apparently not foreseen by the original developers and funders. In these sectors, variety generation was facilitated by historically and culturally specific conditions. The San Francisco
Bay area provided a creative and unconventional culture that encouraged innovation. The 'gift culture' in IT, which stimulated technology diffusion, was made possible in part because US defense expenditure to provided munificent resources for IT development during the Cold War.
The anti-trust tendencies of the judiciary led large companies to make available innovative technologies, including RISC and UNIX, for licensing on favourable terms (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998) .
Scientific knowledge created with government support was not sufficient to create an IT economy. This is illustrated by the contrast with the Soviet Union, where the absence of incentives and market mechanisms for transforming scientific advances into industrial innovation prevented the command economy's transition to the information age (Mowery, 1996) . However, market mechanisms represented "…only one level and mode of selection" (Metcalfe, 1994 p.29) .
Cultural factors, government policy and institutions that included the universities and standards setting bodies were part of the co-evolutionary process from which complementary innovations emerged in the US. In Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, public support for industrial research and production made possible the increases in corporate production capacity and skills that raised yields and sustained rates of improved performance of semiconductors alongside massive reduction of costs (e.g. Kim, 1997) . Asian public expenditure helped sustain Moore's Law.
Feedback Mechanisms Connecting Variety Generation, Selection and Propagation

User-producer interaction and learning
Technologies are not simply selected in the marketplace on the basis of pre-given price and quality attributes, but are constructed and refined through a collaborative learning process (Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, 1987) . Early input-output computing kits like the Altair became the personal computer through user involvement. Learning on the part of providers and users continue to shape developments as markets mature. Early customers for a new product, looking for a new solution, are prepared to accept relatively unreliable products with complex interfaces (Rogers, 1983) . As a wider range of users is reached, usability and reliability become key requirements. In the PC sector early adopters used the machines to write their own programs but by the early 1980s pre-packaged applications took over in consumer markets.
Competitive selection around standards
In networked industries, users benefit as the number of users of an innovation increases. 10 Katz and Shapiro identified 3 sources of consumption externalities from which users benefit in networked industries. (1) The direct physical effect of the number of purchasers, as might be found with a telephone system where utility increases with the number of connections. (2) Indirect effects such as the availability of associated products, as might be seen with software for a particular type of computer hardware, or pre-recorded tapes for videocassette recorders. (3) Support effects, whereby the quality and availability of post-purchase service depends upon the experience and size of the service network (Katz and Shapiro, 1985) . If these benefits are to be experienced, products must be compatible with each other, calling for agreed, imposed or de facto technical standards.
There are also advantages in common focus on a given set of production problems. Pressures to standardize the wide range of new variants launched by the early experimental phase of a newly commercialised technology result in the emergence of a dominant design of an assembled product, as in the 'keyboard, monitor, processor' features of the PC. This is pivotal for the formation of an industry in the conventional sense of a set of producers producing competing products (Utterback, 1994; Munir and Phillips, 2002) . A related development is a set of technical standards that promote interoperability. These include protocols for connectivity in telecommunications and the media or common interfaces modes in hardware and software. 11 In the three sectors examined, variety generation and selection interacted around the adoption of technical standards. Once a specific technical standard is selected, switching costs are created for consumers who have invested funds and knowledge in that standard. A path dependent lock-in of this kind helps to explain why the market does not always select the best performing technology (Arthur, 1990; Rohlf 2001.43 ).
Network Externalities Reinforce Selection
In the network products we have reviewed, the need for products to be compatible or support interoperability was a critical factor in determining the survival of firms offering early experimental designs. The emergence of a preferred solution changes the competitive environment to provide an advantage to those firms that adopt the standard as compared with those that have non-standard products (Tegarden et al., 1999) . For products in these markets, selection and propagation are not empirically separable. The rapid propagation of winning products results in the selection of these products by new adopters, with increasing sales tipping the likelihood of further sales in the winners' direction.
The combination of selection and propagation acts as a self-reinforcing process so that the market power of dominant players is increased. In theory, when network effects operate at the (Gabel, 1991 p.24). As early as 1987 over 80% of the market was compatible with the IBM PC (Grindley, 1995 p.140) . Buyers' preference was the overt mechanism of selection in the PC sector which led to the elimination of non-compatible systems such as Apple's.
Path dependence and the Acceleration of Innovation
Innovation in the ICT sector took the form of specialist niche activity, with these niches providing a favourable environment for new entrant growth. As technologies matured, certain niches expanded to become mainstream markets attracting complementary activity. Those producers of bandwagon products that acquired a massive user set enjoyed great competitive advantage. But some niches survived where the needs of particular markets were met.
The increasing diffusion and interoperability of PCs resulting from earlier advances drove the emergence of electronic messaging, enabled by the Internet and World Wide Web. Further progress in PC processing and memory enabled advances in other hardware and software sectors, notably telecommunications and image processing. A new conjuncture in computer and communications was to be seen in mobile devices and handheld computers. In each of these cases, technological advances built on what had gone before, in the path dependent mode created by cumulative feedback processes.
The pace of change was accelerated by interactivities, increasing the difficulty of predicting and synchronising innovative products, services and modes of provision. Schumpeter argued that the swarming of innovations was responsible not only for "leaps and bounds of progress" but also for setbacks "carrying in their wake not only the primary disturbance, inherent in the process, but a whole string of secondary ones and the possibilities ... of crises." (Schumpeter, 1928 p.384 ) He recognised that difficulties in assimilating bursts of disruptive innovation can set off periodic disturbances in the economy.
As complex dynamic systems, industries are prone to surge effects in the intensity of innovative activity. Such surges provide impetus to technological progress, but they create asynchronies and disturbances with unpredictable outcomes. There are historically specific factors at work. In the late 1990s, when stock market speculation led to the boom and bust of Internet ventures incentives exerted by increasing use of share options for managers and the rapid dismantling of regulatory controls were among the precipitating factors (Stiglitz, 2003) . 
IV Diversity, Uniformity and Innovation
Despite contrary historical evidence, we tend to assume that the future will be like the past. A complexity approach leads us to expect that continuity will be challenged by reactions to current conditions and consequent feedback effects. In this final section we explore some of the difficulties of predicting co-evolutionary developments when complex dynamic processes are at work.
The Darwinian evolution of life forms takes place unimaginably slowly, the evolutionary mechanisms of variety generation, selection and propagation occurring independently of each other. The random emergence of new variants and the elimination of those that are less adaptive takes place over 'deep time'. Survival rewards for mutual accommodation have been found to underlie co-evolution (Goodwin, 1994) . In the natural world, collaboration is not pursued because its benefits are envisaged, but through blind responses that sustain mutual advantages. Moreover it does not require radical advances in knowledge to give rise to radical innovations.
Incremental innovations that are brought together from different domains may result in new species of technology. Different streams of technology, each developing gradually, can give rise to major advances. For example, gradual advances in magnetic data storage and in optical signalling were combined in established companies to provide the basis for video recording.
Applications of newly combined technologies to entirely new domains of use can sustain innovation.
Uncertainties affect the pace of innovation
Forces favourable to continuing rapid innovation are not the only trends in evidence. There are counter forces at work that make outcomes unpredictable. "The difference between systems that are predictable and systems that are not predictable lies in the numbers of degrees of freedom they possess … (Bass, 1999, p.236) . Degrees of freedom are all the greater when industries have no enduring structure or boundary, contrary to assumptions in industrial economics (Munir and Philips, 2002) . In ICT industries in particular, the boundaries of industries were reconfigured as new products and sectors were spawned, through developments that encompassed workstations, hand held devices, Internet-based services and multiple applications in telecommunications.
Among forces that could counter rapid innovation are the intractable requirements of synchrony as industries mature and interconnect. On the supply side, the synchronization required for the co-evolution of technologies is continually challenged by delays between design and market readiness, and lags between investment and returns from sales. Market signals are celebrated for spontaneous coordination of supply and demand. They are less effective at re-synchronizing temporal de-couplings. The stock market crash of the Millennium points to asynchronies that are not corrected by stabilizing market mechanisms but are instead exacerbated by their positive feedback effects. In financial markets herd behaviour prevails and the real economy pays for recoordination through crisis and slump. The price may rise with the proliferation of derivatives which have increased the liquidity that facilitates exchange at the cost of potentially greater dislocating effects.
The enabling conditions of the late 20 th century had a largely unanticipated impact on innovation.
Federal investment in science was expected to foster innovation in large companies through a linear process in which scientific research eventuated in commercial and social returns (Bush, 1960) . Instead, the most important innovations of the information revolution were made by resource-constrained new entrants. This unintended outcome of policy was the result of contingent conditions that are not self perpetuating. Selection processes are increasingly supporting big laboratories and established paradigms rather than small innovative teams and new ideas. The bureaucratization of science and intellectual property arrangements that benefit established players could endanger sources of variety and the selection of new variants. In the US, the post World War II judiciary applied an anti-trust regime that made it possible for new entrants to challenge established players (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998) . More recently, established players who could defend their patents have been favoured by intellectual property arrangements and rulings. Pressures on companies to focus on short-term share price gains have also increased (Stiglitz, 2003) . The slump following the 'correction' to share prices in 2000 greatly reduced the availability of venture capital for experimental new entrants. Such risk averse investment conditions make it difficult for new entrants to play the role of agent of change.
In Europe, the standardization of selection conditions has been a goal of policy. These are less favourable to the rise of new species of activity than diverse economic habitats providing a variety of different selection conditions. Market selection may not provide independent mechanisms for variety generation when expected returns from a known set of selection forces determine the variants launched on the market. The prospect of low returns have limited the extent of innovation in drugs for common diseases and ICT suited to conditions in low income economies. 13 Rather than becoming more equal, the distribution of income within and between countries has become less equitable, limiting the purchasing power of potential consumers of ICT innovations and creating the 'digital divide', a societal segregation between those with access to ICTs and those without. A key influence on diversity will be new selection conditions in emergent economies and the response of innovators there to information technologies.
Physical limits to improvements in technical performance have brought waves of innovation to an end in the past (Freeman, 1982) . But before such limits are reached, there are other factors at work that can alter the pace of innovation as technologies and industries mature, notably the lock-in of consumers to dominant technologies and asymmetries of market power. Established firms can use returns from past successes to innovate. Both Microsoft and Intel, alert to potential competition, have attempted regular product updates and innovations. But incumbent firms have only rarely shown the capability and incentive to introduce radical innovations (Utterback, 1994; Nairn, 2000) . It was not until pioneering new entrants had demonstrated the returns to be 13 Geographic diffusion and diversity of selection regime have taken on new impetus with the growth of the Indian and Chinese economies.
the Xerox PARC case illustrates, even established companies promoting advanced R&D faced inertia that prevented assimilation of the knowledge they generated in their own labs (Rumelt, 1995) .
Along with the acquisition of more innovative entrants, the most likely source of major innovations from incumbent companies is the application of a known technology to a new domain, often through new combinations (Levinthal, 1998 In sum, the evidence we have examined reveals the extent to which market exchange stimulates both the multiple variants of goods and services that meet diverse needs and the uniformities that make exchange possible. Amplifying processes reinforce emerging concentration and asymmetries of market power. Kauffman has shown that as networks mature and become interlocking, there is a reduction in the diversity of outcomes (Kauffman, 1996) . Whether or not this will apply to ICT technologies depends on the interaction of countervailing forces. The close coupling of variety generation, selection and propagation has accelerated innovation in ICT over the period examined, but this dynamic has depended on a contingent set of favourable conditions, including long-term investment in science and technology and incentives for technical entrepreneurs. Policy can be directed towards fostering favourable conditions but these are much more specific and difficult to provide than an ill-defined 'climate of enterprise'.
In the twentieth century, government policies in the home of free markets helped to shape the very conditions of supply and demand that gave rise to innovations. Advances in science, the output of skilled technologists and an intellectual property regime favourable to innovation, were among the conditions of supply formed by US policy. Demand was influenced by public procurement, regulation and fiscal incentives, among other factors (Stiglitz, 2003) . It was an unintended consequence of Cold War defence policies that they created munificent conditions not only for science but for technology-based enterprise in the USA. 16 Radical innovation in the private sector resulted from the application of new knowledge made available in the public domain by massive public funding on IT research in US companies and universities (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998) . In particular, government funding supported the advance of IT from invention to market-ready applications, bridging the gap between R&D and market, paving the way for profitable venture capital and public listings.
Policies that promoted ICT reveal that supply and demand do not operate as market forces ICTs across generations of innovation shows that investment in knowledge yields returns more extensive than the capture of gains by originators. Entrepreneurial innovators are stimulated by new ideas and often act on them prior to shifts in supply or effective demand. Path breaking entrants anticipate and respond to selection forces in a different manner from incumbents. It is because they have much less to lose that entrepreneurial ventures pursue opportunities overlooked by better resourced players. Although the rate of failure of new entrants is wasteful, this failure constitutes the overhead required to generate diversity. Experimental entrants give rise to distributed forms of innovation, the costs of which are mitigated by serendipity and the triumph of the unexpected.
